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Abstract: In this paper we show, in an incomplete contracts framework that combines asymmetric information
and moral hazard, that by permitting insiders to trade on personal account the equilibrium level of output can be
increased and shareholder welfare can be improved. There are two reasons for this. First, insider trading impounds
information regarding the costs and benefits of effort and perk consumption into asset prices, which allows
shareholders to choose more efficient portfolio allocations. Second, allowing insider trading can induce managers
to increase their stake in the firm beyond that obtained through bargaining with shareholders. This effect leads
to a reduction in managerial perk consumption and/or increased managerial effort. Insider trading can also be
costly for shareholders’ intermediate range of monitoring costs and project difficulty because, in such cases, the
efforts of managers are quite sensitive to the exact level of fractional shareownership, which managers can
endogenously change if they are able to trade on personal account. Interestingly, when monitoring and effort costs
are low, managers may prefer restrictions on their ability to trade as such restrictions will force shareholders to
offer them a larger fraction of output.
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1 Introduction
Securities trading by corporate o±cers has become one of the most heavily regulated capital market
transactions. The Securities and Exchange (SEC) Act of 1933, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in
cases such as Speed v Transamerica Corporation, places broad prohibitions on trading by corporate insiders
using ¯rm-speci¯c private information. More recent legislative initiatives, such as the Insider Trading and
Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1984, have forti¯ed this prohibition.
Not surprisingly, the rationale for this elaborate structure of regulation has received signi¯cant attention
both from ¯nancial economists and legal scholars. Much of this attention has been provided by the \law and
economics" literature. For the most part, this literature has viewed insider trading prohibitions unfavorably.
This view ¯nds its classic expression in the work of Manne (1966). One of the arguments made by Manne
for allowing insider trading is that such trading allows the information possessed by insiders to be rapidly
impounded in the prices of securities and thus increases the e±ciency of capital markets. The importance
of this argument is evidenced by its profound impact on subsequent research into insider trading. There
is, however, another aspect of security trading by corporate o±cers discussed by Manne that has received
considerably less analytical attention: the e®ect of security market transactions on managerial incentives
and agency problems within the corporation. The view of Manne and other adherents of the law and
economics school is that security trading can improve the alignment of interests between outside claimants
and management by allowing managers to pro¯t from the appreciation in ¯rm value engendered by their
e®orts.
Much of the subsequent literature on insider trading has been devoted to examining the arguments of
Manne in a rigorous analytical fashion. The results of this analysis have not, in general, been supportive of
Manne's conclusions. For example, Fishman and Hagerty (1992) show that insider trading may discourage
the production of information by outside analysts and thus reduce the net informational e±ciency of stock
markets. It has also been demonstrated by Ausubel (1990) and Manove (1989) that, even absent this
e®ect, the adverse selection costs for outsiders engendered by insider trading make the raising of external
¯nance more costly for outside investors. Manne's second argument in favor of insider trading has also been
critiqued in Noe (1995) who demonstrates that, even if managerial short sales are prohibited, endogenous
changes in the pattern of managerial compensation in response to a relaxation of insider trading restrictions
may actually lower the equilibrium level of managerial e®ort.
This paper develops a model that links moral hazard and informational transmission aspects of insider
trading and shows that the bene¯cial e®ects of insider trading, which are not entirely apparent when the2
informational and moral hazard arguments for insider trading are modeled separately, become apparent when
the two problems are interlinked. More speci¯cally, we show that when managers have private information
regarding the scope of the private bene¯ts they can earn from consuming perks and/or avoiding e®ort and
managerial ex-post bargaining power allows managers to extract rents from corporate owners, permitting
insider trading can both increase ¯rm output and increase the welfare of shareholders.
The mechanism through which shareholder welfare is improved is as follows: permitting insider trading
leads managers to take positions in the ¯rm's stock. These positions are long positions when managers are
able to extract only a small fraction of ¯rm output from negotiations with owners and short when managers
can extract large fractions. The size of the manager's position is independent of his private information.
To induce this uniform pattern of portfolio holdings across the range of private signals, share prices must
vary with the manager's information signal. Thus, managerial trading increases the informativeness of prices
and the welfare of shareholders and, when managers extract only a small fraction of ¯rm value in explicit
compensation, it also increases the fraction of the ¯rm's cash °ows held by managers.
The above argument thus implies that, when projects have fairly low average e®ort costs and monitoring
managerial e®ort is not very costly, shareholders can concede to managers only a small fraction of ¯rm rents
and rely on insider trading to induce large managerial holdings. These shareholdings, in turn, augment the
manager's incentive to increase output. In this scenario, permitting insider trading increases shareholder
welfare for two reasons: it both provides low-cost incentives for managerial e®ort and makes prices more
informative. When monitoring is very costly or applying e®ort to the project is also costly, insider trading
also improves owner welfare. In this case, owners recognize that, regardless of the insider trading regime, they
wil be able to extract only a small fraction of the ¯rm's output for themselves. By permitting insider trading,
owners can at least reduce their exposure to the risks associated with the manager's private information.
Permitting insider trading is only disadvantageous when e®ort is fairly sensitive to monitoring policies and
optimal monitoring requires o®ering managers a large, but not exclusive, fraction of ¯rm output. In this case,
the short positions insiders optimally take in their capital market transactions negate some of the incentive
e®ects of monitoring, adversely impacting e®ort. If this e®ect is large enough it can more than compensate
for the positive impact of insider trading on price informativeness. The e®ect of insider trading on managerial
welfare is somewhat at odds with its e®ect on shareholder. When monitoring is relatively costless and e®ort
costs to managers are, on average, low, shareholders will adopt very rigorous monitoring policies when they
permit insider trading. Such polices, by curtailing management's ability to extract wealth, lower managerial
welfare. Thus, the ability of shareholders to substitute insider trading opportunities for direct compensation
may adversely a®ect managerial welfare and lead managers to prefer ex ante to be deprived of insider trading3
opportunities.
These results are related to, but do not overlap, the results of a number of recent papers on insider
trading. Bebchuk (1994) also considers the consequences of insider trading for managerial behavior. He
shows that insider trading opportunities provide managers with an incentive to increase project risk. Our
work di®ers from Bebchuk's in two important respects. First, we model a costly e®ort decision by the
manager, rather than a costless choice of project variance. More importantly, we model the process of price
determination. Bebchuk, in contrast, assumes that insiders capture an exogenously speci¯ed fraction of the
di®erence between true and expected project value. By modeling the process of price determination, we are
able to compute the welfare e®ects of insider trading on all agents in the economy and analyze the e®ect
of trading on price informativeness. Our work is also related to Shin's (1996) analysis in that it focuses on
the optimal regulation of insider trading. However, the trade-o®s determining optimal regulatory policy in
our analysis are very di®erent than in Shin's. In our analysis all gains and losses from insider trading are
absorbed by insider managers and shareholders. In Shin, an exogenous group of liquidity traders subsidize
insider trading through their trading losses. Thus, Shin's objective function for determining optimal insider
trading policies|minimizing the losses of liquidity traders|has no analog in our framework. In addition,
the variables he considers are market structure variables while we consider the sort of ¯rm-speci¯c variables
typically utilized in corporate ¯nance research.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the basic model of costly monitoring under
conditions of moral hazard and informational asymmetry. Section 3 introduces insider trading into the
analysis and considers its e®ects on managerial e®ort and the pricing of securities. Section 4 considers the
e®ect of insider trading on the ex ante welfare of shareholders and identi¯es those parameterizations of the
model under which insider trading increases shareholder welfare and thus identi¯es parameterizations of the
model that would lead shareholders to permit managers to engage in informed trading. Section 5 provides
a graphical welfare analysis of the e®ects of insider trading on managerial welfare, shareholder welfare, and
economic e±ciency.
2 Basic model
First, we delineate a three-date model of manager-shareholder interaction in an incomplete contracting
setting. At date -1, the ¯rm is owned by a single shareholder and managed by a manager. At this date, the
shareholder makes a decision regarding an investment in monitoring technology. The import of this decision
will be delineated later. At date 0, the manager makes an e®ort decision, e. Later we will incorporate
an opportunity for the manager and the shareholder to trade securities at date 0 into the basic, no-trade
scenario outlined here. The manager's decision will impact the date 1 value, V , of the ¯rm. This value is4
then divided between the shareholder and the manager. Although ¯rm value is observable at date 1, it is not
contractible at date 0. The lack of contractability follows because the ¯rm cannot pre-commit to retaining
the manager and the manager cannot pre-commit to remaining with the ¯rm. At date 1, the manager has
the opportunity to negotiate the terms of his contract. The manager's negotiating position is based on
the fact that he possesses ¯rm-speci¯c skills which render the value of the ¯rm without the manager, V ,
di®erent than its value with the manager, V . We model bargaining by allocating all bargaining power to the
manager, implying that in a Nash-type bargaining solution, the manager will give the shareholders nothing
more than the value of the ¯rm without his ¯rm-speci¯c skills. We represent this value by V . Thus, the
date 1 share of value received by the shareholder will equal V and the date 1 share of value received by the
manager will equal V ¡V . As in Aghion, Dewatripont, and Rey (1994), we consider the ability of agents (the
shareholder in our case) to in°uence V by making an investment c ¸ 0 in monitoring technology at date -1.
The investment in the monitoring technology, combined with the ¯rm value, determines the value of the ¯rm
without the manager's ¯rm-speci¯c human capital. That is, V ´ V (c;V ). An example of such a monitoring
technology would be investing in control systems that carefully record ¯rm actions during the period, thus
making it easier for a new manager to step in at date 1 to manage the ¯rm and thereby increasing the value
of the shareholder's exit option in the date 1 negotiations. The timing of events is displayed below.
date ¡1 date 0 date 1




able e®ort decision, e.I f
¯nancial markets are open,
manager and shareholder
also make trading decisions.
Value, V , is observed and
divided.
For simplicity, we assume the multiplicative form for the valuation function: V (c;V )=( 1¡¯ ( c ))V ,
where ¯(¢) is a twice-di®erentiable function of c, with ¯0 < 0, ¯00 > 0, ¯(0) = 1, and limc!1 ¯(c)=0 .T h e
terminal cash °ow to the manager is thus given by ¯(c)V . We assume that, at date 0, when the manager
makes his e®ort decision, V is a random variable that is positively dependent on managerial e®ort. More
speci¯cally, we assume that V ´ V (e)=e+ ~ N, where ~ N is a unit-normal random variable. The manager's
preferences over risky date-1 prospects, ~ X, and e®ort choices, e, are given by the expectation of the function
u : <£<£<!<de¯ned as
u(±;e;x) ´¡ expf¡[¡e2 +( r+±) e+x ] g ;
where ± is a managerial preference parameter known to the manager at date 0 but unknown to other agents.
However, all other agents have prior distribution over ±, under which ~ ± » N(0;¾2
±); ¾± represents the degree
of ex ante uncertainty regarding the manager's e®ort incentives, and r captures the manager's \expected"5
preference for e®ort. The random variables, ~ ± and ~ N, are independent. The shareholder has preferences
over terminal wealth that are given by a constant absolute risk aversion expected utility function with a risk
aversion parameter of 1.
2.1 The manager's e®ort decision
The manager's e®ort problem is, thus,
max
e2<
E[u(±;e;¯ ~ V )]:
The solution to this problem as a function of ± and ¯ is given by
e¤(±;¯)=
1
2( ¯+r+± ) :
Note that the optimal e®ort level for the manager is increasing in his bargaining power (¯), his expected
e®ort preference (r), and the shock to his e®ort preference (±).
2.2 Shareholder monitoring policies
The shareholder maximizes ex ante (date - 1) wealth over choices of c.A s¯maps [0;1) monotonically
into (0;1], instead of viewing ¯ as a function of c, we can view c 2 [0;1) as a function of ¯ 2 (0;1]. Thus
we can maximize the shareholder's utility over ¯ 2 (0;1] instead of c 2 [0;1], and, after solving for the
optimal level of ¯, denoted by ¯¤
N, we can determine the optimal investment in monitoring, c¤
N, using ¯¤
N.
This approach greatly simpli¯es the proofs of the results and will be followed in the sequel.
The shareholder determines ¯ at date -1. Thus, the utility of the shareholder at date 0 is given as
follows. For a ¯xed ~ ±, the date 1 payo® to the shareholder (in utility terms) is
¡exp
n
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Thus, up to a monotone transformation, the utility of the shareholder at date 0 when managerial trading is
not allowed is given by
WN(¯)=¡ c ( ¯ )+
1
2(1 ¡ ¯)(¯ + r) ¡
1





Thus the optimal monitoring policy for the shareholder when there are no trading opportunities is the




In order to render our analysis transparent, we utilize the following simple exponential functional form for
the monitoring cost function:
c(¯) ´¡
°
4log(¯); 0 <°<2(1 + r): (1)
In (1) the parameter ° is inversely proportional to the return, in terms of an increased share of project cash
°ows, from increased monitoring. Thus, ° measures the ine±cacy of monitoring. The parametric restriction
°>0 in (1) implies that increased investment in monitoring actually increases the share of value obtained
by the shareholder. The parametric restriction °<2(1 + r) is imposed to avoid corner solutions in which
monitoring is so costly that shareholder utility is maximized by simply giving the project to the manager,
i.e., setting ¯ = 1. Given the functional form speci¯ed in (1), characterizing the solution to this problem is
a simple exercise. The required characterization is provided below.
Theorem 1. The equilibrium fraction of ¯rm value appropriated by the manager, ¯¤, when managerial






























The second-order condition is clearly satis¯ed at any point satisfying the ¯rst order condition; moreover. (1)
ensures that there exists a unique ¯¤ 2 (0;1) satisfying (2). From the quadratic formula, Theorem 1 follows.
The trade-o®s underlying Theorem 1 are apparent. The shareholder has one incentive for increasing
her investment in monitoring: higher levels of monitoring improve her bargaining position and thus increase
the share of rents that can be extracted from the manager in contract negotiations. The countervailing
incentive is that investment in monitoring, while increasing the bargaining power of shareholders, attenuates
managerial e®ort incentives. This attenuation of incentives from reduced bargaining power is consistent
with standard results in the incomplete contracting literature (see, for example, Hart 1988) which have
established that e±ciency is furthered by maximizing the ex post bargaining power of the agents making the
most crucial action choices. The trade-o® between two e®ects, the increase in the share of value resulting
from monitoring versus the reduction in total output due to e®ort attenuation, determines the shareholder's
optimal monitoring investment.
2.3 Comparative statics when trading is prohibited
The three exogenous parameters of determining the optimal monitoring policy are the average manage-
rial e®ort parameter, r, uncertainty regarding managerial e®ort preferences, ¾±, and the monitoring ine±cacy7
parameter, °. It is also evident that higher levels of managerial managerial e®ort preference, r, induce larger
investments in monitoring. This follows because higher average managerial e®ort preference reduces the
cost, in terms of lost e®ort, from increasing shareholder bargaining power. Increased uncertainty regarding
the manager's e®ort preferences increases project risk and thus lowers project value, leading to a reduction
in the optimal investment in appropriating value. Thus, increased uncertainty increases the share of value
captured by the manager and reduces monitoring investment, consequently increasing the fraction of ¯rm
value captured by the manager. The e®ect of increasing monitoring ine±cacy on equilibrium monitoring in-
vestment is more subtle. Increasing the ine±cacy of monitoring investments always increases ¯¤, the fraction
of the ¯rms cash °ows that the manager can capture given an optimal monitoring policy. This reduction in
¯ lowers monitoring costs. However, the reduction in the e±cacy of the monitoring technology implies that
the cost of even this reduced level of ¯ may exceed the costs of the higher level of ¯ associated with the
more e±cacious monitoring technology. Thus, reductions in the e±cacy of monitoring technology may lead
either to increases or decreases in monitoring costs. The nonmonotonic relationship between the quality of
monitoring technology and equilibrium monitoring costs is illustrated in Figure 1. These comparative statics
are summarized in the following Lemma.
Lemma 1. When insider trading is prohibited, increasing average managerial e®ort preference, r, increases
the level of monitoring and lowers ¯, the fraction of rents captured by the manager. Increasing uncertainty
regarding managerial e®ort preferences, ¾±, increases the fraction of value captured by the manager and
lowers monitoring expenditure. Reducing the e±cacy of the monitoring technology (i.e., raising °) increases
the fraction of ¯rm value captured by the manager and may raise or lower optimal monitoring expenditures.
Proof. All of the comparative statics follow from the relationship between ¯¤ and c¤ and applying the implicit
function theorem to the ¯rst-order condition given by (2).
3 The e®ect of insider trading on the agency problem
The aim of this section is to consider the impact of opening a ¯nancial claims market at date 0 in which
both the manager and the shareholder can trade their claims on ¯rm output. In this market, claims on the
¯rm's stock, along with a riskless bond, trade on an anonymous securities market. The price of the riskless
bond and the ¯rm's stock are observable at date 0. Moreover, agents can condition their asset demands and
e®ort decisions on these prices. Rational expectations characterize equilibrium in the securities market at
date 0.1 More speci¯cally, assume that the ¯rm has one share outstanding and let µm(µs) be the net trade
1 By utilizing a rational expectations framework to analyze insider trading we follow Leland (1992) and
diverge from Shin (1996) and Noe (1995) who use a market microstructure model featuring uniformed
liquidity traders with exogenous security demands.8
vector of the manager (shareholder) after trade. The total date 1 payo® to the manager is thus given by
¯V +µm((1 ¡ ¯)V ¡ P):
The payo® to the shareholder at date 1 is
(1 + µs)((1 ¡ ¯)V ¡ P):
The date 0 market clearing price in the capital market is determined via a rational expectations equilibrium:
agents take the price as given; shareholders conjecture a relationship between P and the manager's e®ort
parameter, ±; the manager maximizes simultaneously over e®ort, e, and portfolio holdings, µm. In equilib-
rium, the shareholder's conjectures are con¯rmed and markets clear, that is, net trades in the stock sum to
zero, i.e.,
µs + µm =0 :
3.1 The date 0 trading/e®ort decision
At date 0 the manager, given his private information regarding the e®ort preference parameter, ±,
chooses a net trade position, µm, and an e®ort level, e. The manager solves this optimization problem taking




2¡(r+±)e¡¯ ~ V (e)¡µm[(1¡¯)~ V (e)¡P]
i
:
Thus, up to a monotone-increasing transformation, the manager's date 0 utility, when he is able to trade
shares in security markets, can be represented as
UT
0 (e;µm;c;P)=¡ e 2+( r+±) e+¯e+µm(1 ¡ ¯)e ¡ µmP ¡
1
2(¯ + µm(1 ¡ ¯))2:




Solving this simple optimization problem yields the following optimal e®ort/trading decision:















The shareholder maximizes his expected date 0 utility conditional on his information. The only information
the shareholder has at date 0 is the clearing price, P. The conditional expectations of the shareholder are9
determined via rational expectations. That is, we ¯rst assume that the shareholder conjectures that the








Given this price conjecture, the manager's e®ort decision is measurable with respect to the shareholder's






Di®erentiating this expression with respect to the shareholder's net trade, µs, yields the following necessary
and su±cient condition for an optimal net trade vector, µ¤
s:
¡(1 ¡ ¯)e + P +( 1+µ ¤
s)(1 ¡ ¯)2 =0 :
Thus, the optimal net trade vector for the shareholder is given by
(ST) µ¤
s =
(1 ¡ ¯)e ¡ P
(1 ¡ ¯)2 ¡ 1:
Plugging the (REE) condition into the managers and shareholder's net demand functions shows that if agents

















Thus, the market clearing condition, µ¤
m + µ¤
s = 0, is satis¯ed, verifying that demand functions induced by
the conjectured relationship between actions and prices, in fact, clear markets. Inspection of MET-e shows
that the shareholder's conjecture of the equilibrium e®ort-price relationship is correct. Thus, the conditions
for a rational expectations equilibrium are satis¯ed.
3.2 The date -1 investment-in-monitoring decision





















Thus, up to a monotone transformation, the shareholder's ex ante utility can be expressed as
WT(¯)=
1








The above problem is a simple optimization problem whose solution is characterized below.
Theorem 2. The optimal monitoring policy when the shareholder permits the manager to engage in insider
trading is given by ¯¤
T =1if °>2 r¡1and by
¯¤
T =
(1 ¡ 2r + ¾2
±)+
p






Proof. The proof is virtually identical to the proof of Theorem 1 and thus will be omitted.
3.3 Comparative statics when trading is permitted
The comparative statics describing the e®ects of the three exogenous parameters, r, ¾±, and °, on the
optimal monitoring policies followed by the ¯rm are identical to those obtained when insider trading is
prohibited. For completeness, this fact is recorded in the next lemma.
Lemma 2. When insider trading is permitted, increasing average managerial e®ort preference, r, increases
the level of monitoring and the fraction of rents captured by the shareholder. Increasing uncertainty regarding
managerial e®ort preferences, ¾±, increases the optimal fraction of value captured by the shareholder and
lowers monitoring expenditure. Reducing the e±cacy of the monitoring technology (i.e., raising °) lowers
the fraction of ¯rm value captured by shareholders and may raise or lower optimal monitoring expenditures.
Proof. The proof is virtually identical to the proof in the case in which insider trading is prohibited and
thus will be omitted.
4 The e®ect of allowing insider trading on shareholder welfare
The di®erence in ex ante shareholder welfare when insider trading is permitted versus when it is pro-





2¯ (1 ¡ ¯) ¡
1






4¯ ¡ ¯2: (3)
Expression (3) is quadratic in ¯. From the quadratic formula we see that (5) has two roots, one at
¯ = 1
2 and the other at ¯ = 3
4. This establishes the following basic characterization of the insider trading
decision.
Theorem 3. The ¯rm will permit managerial insider trading if and only if it chooses an investment in
monitoring that induces either a large or small share of the ¯rm value to be captured by management. That
is, permitting insider trading is optimal if and only if the optimal fraction of value to concede to the manager,
¯¤, satis¯es 1
2 · ¯¤ < 3
4.
4.1 Comparative statics of the shareholder-preferred policy
Our next result describes the shareholder's optimal monitoring/insider trading policy as a function
of the exogenous parameters of the model. Our basic result is that, when the shareholder optimizes over11
insider trading policies, the relationships between the fraction of value to concede to the manager, ¯, and the
exogenous parameters of the model inherit monotonicity from the monotonicity of the relationship between
¯ and the exogenous parameters found when the insider trading policy is ¯xed. However, in contrast to the
¯xed insider trading regime case, when the ¯rm is allowed to choose an insider trading policy, the ¯-parameter
relationships are discontinuous at those levels of the parameters in which the optimal insider trading regime
shifts. Such regime shifts always occur at some point when the mean managerial e®ort parameter is varied
across its admissible range. However, regime shifts need not always occur with variations in the other
parameters of the model. To formalize these ideas, we ¯rst need to formalize the set of admissible parameters
for the model. To this end, de¯ne R (¡) to represent the values of r (°) satisfying the admissibility condition
0 <°<2(1+r). Thus, R and ¡ represent the feasible range of the mean managerial e®ort, r, and ine±cacy
of monitoring, °. The dependence of each of these sets on the value of the other parameter is suppressed in
the notation. The basic comparative static result is given below.
Lemma 3. (a) There exist r¡, r+ 2<such that insider trading is prohibited if and only if r 2 (r¡;r+).
The optimal fraction of the ¯rm that permits the manager to appropriate (¯) is a decreasing function of r
de¯ned on R. Further, this function is discontinuous at r¡ and r+. (b) There exist °¡, °+ 2<such that
insider trading is prohibited if and only if ° 2 ¡\(°¡;° +). The optimal fraction of the ¯rm that permits the
manager to appropriate is a decreasing function of ° de¯ned on ¡. Further this function is discontinuous in at
°¡ and °+, whenever °¡, °+ 2 ¡. (c) There exist ¾±¡, ¾±+ 2<such that insider trading is prohibited if and
only if ¾± 2 [0;1) \ (¾±¡;¾ ±+). The optimal fraction of the ¯rm that permits the manager to appropriate
is a decreasing function of ¾± de¯ned on [0;1). Further, this function is discontinuous at ¾±¡ and ¾±+,
whenever ¾±+, ¾±+ 2 [0;1).
Proof. We only prove (a), the proofs for (b) and (c) being virtually identical. Let B¤ : R ! (0;1] represent
the function that maps mean levels of managerial e®ort preference, r 2 R, into optimal factions of value to
concede to the manager ¯¤, under the optimal insider trading policy (dependence on the other parameters
being suppressed in the notation for simplicity). Let B¤
T : R ! (0;1] represent the function that maps
mean levels of managerial e®ort, r 2 R, into optimal fractions of value to concede to the manager, ¯¤,
when insider trading is permitted. De¯ne B¤
N : R ! (0;1] analogously for the case where insider trading
is prohibited. Let W¤
T(¢;r):( 0 ; 1] !<represent, for each ¯xed r, the function mapping the fraction
of ¯rm value conceded by the manager to the ex ante payo® to the shareholder when insider trading is
permitted. De¯ne W ¤
N(¢;r):( 0 ;1] !<analogously for the case where insider trading is not allowed, and
de¯ne W(¢;r):( 0 ;1] !<by W(¯;r) = maxfWT(¯;r);W N(¯;r)g.
We ¯rst show that B¤ is decreasing. To see this, ¯rst note that B¤
N and BT depend continuously on12
r. Next, note that B¤ never attains the values 1
2 or 3
4. To see this note that if B¤ = 1
2, for example, then,













2;r) = 0. But this is impossible, as can be seen from inspecting the derivative of
expression (3). A similar argument shows that B¤ never attains the value 3
4.
To see this, ¯rst note that B¤
N and BT depend continuously on r and both of these expressions are
decreasing. Thus, by Theorem 3 and the above observation, we have that B¤ must be 1-1.
Because B¤ is not continuous, the fact that B¤ is 1-1 does not prove that it is monotone. However,
monotonicity results from the following argument. Let Ro = fr 2 R : B¤(r) 2 (1
2; 3
4)g; let R+ = fr 2 R :
B¤(r) > 3
4)g, let R¡ = fr 2 R : B¤(r) < 1
2g.A s B ¤can have at most two points of discontinuity and is
monotone decreasing at continuity points, the sets, Ro, R+, and R¡ are intervals because B¤(r)=B ¤
N( r );
whenever r 2 R+ [ R¡ we have that R¡ >R + . As the union of the three intervals exhausts R we must
have that R¡ ¸ Ro ¸ R+. Thus, the function B¤ is monotonically decreasing.
Because both B¤
N and B¤
T converge to 1 as r # r and converge to 0 as r "1 , we have that R¡ and R+
are both nonempty. Because B¤ = B¤
T on R+ [ R¡, and B¤
T is a continuous function, we must also have
that Ro is nonempty. For, if Ro were empty, then we would have that R = R+ [ R¡ and that B¤ = B¤
T
everywhere. But, B¤
N is continuous, and Ro being empty means that B¤ never attains the values of ¯ in the
interval (1
2; 3
4), violating the intermediate value property of continuous functions.
A typical example of the functional relationship between the exogenous parameters, r, ¾±, and °, and
the optimal insider trading /monitoring policy for the ¯rm is diagrammed in Figures 2-4. Consistent with
the results in the theorem, these relationships are monotonic but not continuous.
5 Welfare Analysis
The earlier analysis has identi¯ed situations in which the welfare of owners is improved by permitting
insider trading. Thus, if allowed to determine corporate insider trading policies, owners will permit insider
trading under certain circumstances. Is it the case that allowing owners to determine insider trading policies
improves overall welfare? To answer this question we need to consider both the channels through which
insider trading impacts the welfare of agents as a whole and how welfare impacts are allocated across agents.
Insider trading impacts welfare via three routes: ¯rst, it impacts price informativeness, second, it impacts
the manager's optimal e®ort decision and thus the level of output; third, it impacts shareholder's optimal
monitoring policy and thereby impacts monitoring costs and the division of output between the ¯rm and
the manager. The twin e®ects of permitting insider trading on price informativeness and on e®ort incentives
are the two e®ects considered in classical law and economics defense of insider trading. We can see that the13
e®ect of insider trading on price informativeness is positive, almost by de¯nition in our rational expectations
model of capital markets. The e®ect of insider trading on e®ort incentives, given a ¯xed monitoring policy
resulting in the fraction ¯ of ¯rm value accruing to the manager, is given by 1
2 ¡ ¯(c). This implies that,
when su±cient resources are invested in monitoring to allow shareholders to capture most of corporate value,
output is higher when insider trading is permitted. Thus, the direct e®ect of permitting insider trading on
output and price informativeness appear to be favorable, at least when the ¯rm is following fairly aggressive
monitoring policies. However, monitoring policies are endogenous and, as we have seen earlier, permitting
insider trading impacts the ¯rm's optimal monitoring policy, and this e®ect can reverse the earlier conclusions
reached under the assumption of a ¯xed monitoring policy.
As the above discussion elucidates, the routes through which insider trading impact agents in the
economy are fairly intricate and this makes welfare analysis complex. Fortunately, given our model structure
we need only consider how these factors impact two types of agents|managers and owners. Our analysis
does not introduce una±liated \noise traders" into the picture who absorb trading losses from trading with
the informed manager. Moreover, on the output side, there are no externalities from production which might
bene¯t other ¯rms or agents in the economy. Thus, if permitting insider trading improves the welfare of both
shareholders and managers, it unambiguously improves overall welfare. The trade-o®s involving the welfare
e®ects of insider trading on shareholders have already been considered in the previous section in which the
conditions under which shareholders would permit managers to engage in insider trade were elucidated.
However, to facilitate the discussion of the relative e®ects of insider trading on managers and shareholders,
we provide, in Figure 5, a diagrammatic presentation of the welfare e®ect of insider trading on shareholders.2
To understand the e®ect on managers, note that by permitting trade shareholders can induce fairly high
levels of output from managers even if these managers are allowed only a small portion of ¯rm output as part
of their employment agreement. If monitoring costs are low, extracting this large portion of output is not
very costly for shareholders. When trade is prohibited, on the other hand, even when monitoring is cheap,
shareholders will be forced to concede a large fraction of project rents to managers in order to provide them
with an incentive to produce. Thus, when monitoring is cheap, permitting insider trading allows shareholders
to pro¯tably capture a much larger fraction of ¯rm output. This bargaining e®ect more than o®sets the
gains to managers from trading on their information. On the other hand, when monitoring is costly, the
strategy of permitting insider trading while forcing managerial rents down through extensive monitoring is no
longer cost e®ective. Thus, insider trading induces only insigni¯cant redistribution of project value between
2 Numerical computations and formulae underlying these graphs are available from the authors upon
request. Graphs were prepared using Mathematica.14
managers and shareholders. In this case, the portfolio bene¯ts of permitting insider trading ensure that
managerial welfare is always higher if trade is permitted. These e®ects on managerial welfare are illustrated
in Figure 6.
As discussed in the previous section, shareholders will tend to permit insider trading when the equilib-
rium fraction of output extracted by shareholders is either very high or very low. In the case where insider
trading is connected to high rent extractions by shareholders. permitting trading is redistributive in that it
lowers the welfare of managers while increasing the welfare of shareholders. On the other hand, when share-
holders choose to allow insider trading in conjunction with a low-rent extraction monitoring policy, insider
trading equilibrium produces a higher level of welfare to both the manager and the shareholder than the the
equilibrium monitoring/trading policy in the absence of insider trading opportunities. These observations
are illustrated in Figure 7, which identi¯es the subset of the parameter space over which permitting insider
trading is favored by both managers and shareholders (region OY-MY in the ¯gure).
One question unanswered by Figure 7 and the above analysis is exactly why permitting insider trading
increases the welfare of both managers and shareholders. As stated earlier, insider trading impacts agent
welfare through a number of di®erent routes. Moreover, the price discovery e®ect is always positive. Thus,
a natural question is whether the price discovery e®ect, in and of itself, accounts for the welfare gain from
permitting insider trading. One way to address this issue is to determine the e®ect of permitting insider
trading on net output, the di®erence between expected output and monitoring costs. If permitting insider
trading can be shown to increase net output for some subset of the parameter space then conditions will
have been identi¯ed under which insider trading is welfare enhancing purely because of its positive e®ect
on managerial incentives. The next diagram investigates this question. The region over which net output
is increased if insider trading is permitted is represented by T = T1 [ T2. As can be seen by comparing
with Figure 5, in both regions T1 and T2, shareholder welfare is also higher when trading is permitted.
Thus, shareholders will permit insider trading whenever trading leads to higher net output. In region T1,
permitting trade also leads to increased managerial welfare. In this region, the fraction of output captured by
management when trading is permitted does not fall signi¯cantly relative to the no-trade fraction. Thus, the
overall bene¯ts from improved e®ort incentives and greater price informativeness lead to higher managerial
welfare. In contrast, in T2, although output is higher and shareholder wealth is higher when insider trading
is permitted, managerial welfare is lower. This occurs because prohibiting insider trading forces shareholders
to rely on granting managers a large share of ¯rm output to increases managerial e®ort incentives. Thus,
permitting insider trading, by allowing ¯rms to move away from these manager-favored divisions of output,
lowers managerial welfare. These e®ects on output are illustrated in Figure 8.15
6 Conclusion
Initial arguments in the law and economics literature opposing blanket prohibitions of insider trad-
ing o®ered two arguments for permitting insider trading: trading increases the informativeness of prices,
and the potential gains from trading pro¯ts improve managerial incentives and thus ameliorate the man-
ager/shareholder moral hazard problem. The extant literature on insider trading considers informativeness
of prices in the absence of managerial moral hazard or considers moral hazard in the absence of any infor-
mational role for prices. The results of this literature are generally not supportive of the ability of insider
trading to induce welfare gains. In contrast, in this paper we develop a model in which moral hazard and
price informativeness are linked in that managers have private information about their own potential gains
from moral hazard. In this setting, we show that by permitting insiders to trade on personal account, the
equilibrium level of output can be increased and shareholder welfare can be improved by permitting insider
trading. This result, which contrasts with the negative results found in much of the extant literature on
insider trading follows for two reasons. First, insider trading impounds information regarding managerial
taste for perk consumption into asset prices, and this allows shareholders to choose more e±cient investment
portfolios. Second, allowing insider trading can induce managers to increase their stake in the ¯rm beyond
the that obtained through bargaining with shareholders. This e®ect leads to a reduction in managerial perk
consumption and/or increased managerial e®ort. Despite these welfare gains from insider trading, managers
may support blanket prohibitions on insider trading because granting shareholders discretionary control over
insider trading policy may lead shareholders to follow polices leading to reduced managerial welfare|namely,
shareholders may permit trade while reducing the fraction of output captured by management through em-
ployment.16
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Figure 1. Optimal investment in monitoring and the quality of monitoring technology
In the above diagram, the average managerial e®ort preference parameter, r, and variance of the managerial
e®ort preference parameter, ¾, are both ¯xed at 1. °, the parameter representing the ine±cacy of the moni-
toring technology, is plotted over its admissible range, (0;4). As the graph illustrates, when the monitoring
technology is very e±cient or very ine±cient, the optimal investment in monitoring is small.
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Figure 2. Optimal share of ¯rm value to concede to the manager and optimal insider trading policy as a
function of managerial e®ort preferences
In the above diagram, the optimal share of ¯rm value to concede to the manager, ¯¤, and the optimal insider
trading policy, as a function of mean managerial e®ort preference (r), is plotted. In the plot, ° is ¯xed at
0.50 and ¾2
± is ¯xed at 1. The range of values over which permitting insider trading is optimal is given by
the horizontal dotted lines.18












Figure 3. Optimal share of ¯rm value to concede to the manager and optimal insider trading policy as a
function uncertainty regarding managerial e®ort preferences
In the above diagram, the optimal share of ¯rm value to concede to the manager, ¯¤, and the optimal insider
trading policy, as a function of degrees of uncertainty regarding managerial e®ort preference (¾2
±), is plotted.
In the plot, r is ¯xed at 1.20 and ° is ¯xed at 0.50. The range of values over which permitting insider trading
is optimal is given by the horizontal dotted lines.












Figure 4. Optimal share of ¯rm value to concede to the manager and optimal insider trading policy as a
function uncertainty regarding managerial e®ort preferences of the monitoring technology
In the above diagram, the optimal share of ¯rm value to concede to the manager, ¯¤, and the optimal insider
trading policy, as a function of the ine±cacy of the monitoring technology, is plotted. In the plot, r is ¯xed
at 1.00 and ¾2
± is ¯xed at 1. The range of values over which permitting insider trading is optimal is given by
the horizontal dotted lines.19













Figure 5. Insider trading and owner welfare
In the above diagram, ¾² is ¯xed at 1, and average e®ort preference of managers (r) and monitoring di±culty
(°) are varied. In the regions labeled T permitting insider trading leads to equilibria in which owner welfare
is higher. In the region marked NT prohibiting trade leads to higher owner welfare.20












Figure 6. Insider trading and managerial welfare
In the above diagram, ¾± is ¯xed at 1, and average e®ort preference of managers (r) and monitoring di±culty
(°) are varied. In the regions labeled T permitting insider trading leads to equilibria in which managerial
welfare is higher. In the region marked NT prohibiting trade leads to higher managerial welfare.21
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Figure 7. The disparate impact of permitting insider trade on owners and managers
In the above diagram, ¾± is ¯xed at 1, and average e®ort preference of managers (r) and monitoring di±culty
(°) are varied. In the regions labeled OY (ON) permitting insider trading leads to equilibria in which owner
welfare is higher (lower). In the region marked MY(MN) prohibiting trade leads to higher (lower) managerial
welfare.22












Figure 8. Regions over which permitting insider trade increases net output, the di®erence between expected
¯rm output and monitoring costs
In the above diagram, ¾± is ¯xed at 1, and average e®ort preference of managers (r) and monitoring di±culty
(°) are varied. In the regions labeled T1 and T2 permitting insider trading leads to equilibria in which net
output is higher. In the region marked NT prohibiting trade leads to higher net output.